Public Quantitative Disclosure Standards for Central Counterparties

ASX Clear Pty Limited

September 2020



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DISCLAIMER	

Introduction

Overview

ASX Clear Pty Limited (ASX Clear) is the central counterparty (CCP) for the clearing of shares, warrants and exchange-traded funds traded on ASX Trade or via an Approved Market Operator (AMO).

As the central counterparty, the Clearing House becomes the seller to every buyer and the buyer to every seller, making it liable for completing all cleared transactions on the relevant market. This occurs through a contractual process known as novation, in accordance with the operating rules of the Clearing House.

Standard and Poor's (S&P)

ASX has obtained an S&P issuer credit rating for ASX Clear. S&P has assigned an AA- long-term and A1+ short-term credit rating to ASX Clear. The rating outlook on the long-term issuer credit rating is stable.

European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) recognition

The European Market Infrastructure Regulation ("EMIR") was adopted by the European Parliament on 4 July 2012. Under EMIR, a CCP established outside of the European Union may continue to provide clearing services to clearing members established in the European Union only if ESMA recognises the CCP as a 'third-country CCP'. In addition, under the European Capital Requirements Directive IV ("CRD IV"), European banks are permitted to apply concessional risk weightings to their group's novated exposures to CCPs if they are "Qualifying CCPs". To become a Qualifying CPP, a CCP established outside the European Union must obtain recognition as a 'third country CCP' under EMIR.

ASX Clear obtained recognition as a "third-country CCP" from ESMA with effect from 27 April 2015. Two important steps to obtaining such recognition were:

- (i) the adoption by the European Commission of its equivalence decision for Australia's regulatory regime on 30 October 2014; and
- (ii) the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding relating to cooperation between ASIC, RBA and ESMA on 27 November 2014.

Background

The CPSS-IOSCO *Principles for financial market infrastructures* (PFMI) states that financial market infrastructures (FMIs) should provide relevant information to participants, relevant authorities and the broader public.

Quantitative data is an important components of the set of public disclosures that is expected of FMIs as part of satisfying the PFMI.

Purpose of the disclosures

The disclosures are intended to support the objectives of enabling stakeholders, including authorities, participants (direct, indirect and prospective) and the public, to:

• compare Central Counterparty (CCP) risk controls, including their financial condition and financial resources to withstand potential losses;

- have a clear, accurate and full understanding of the risks associated with a CCP (in accordance with Principle 23, Key Consideration 5);
- understand and assess a CCP's systemic importance and its impact on systemic risk in all jurisdictions and currency areas for which it provides services, from which it has material membership or in which there are linked infrastructures; and
- understand and assess the risks of participating in CCPs (directly, and, to the extent relevant, indirectly).

Principle 23 states that FMIs should, at a minimum, disclose "basic data" on transaction volumes and values. Principle 23 also states that FMIs should disclose data on their financial condition, their financial resources to withstand potential losses, the timeliness of settlements, and other performance statistics. They should disclose sufficient information for participants and prospective participants to understand fully the risks of participating in the system. This disclosure is expected to be to the public rather than restricted to participants or members.

Frequency and type of disclosure

The matrix below details the quantitative disclosures as required in the Public Quantitative disclosure standards for central counterparties.

These standards can be accessed via the following link. http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d125.htm

For each standard that requires a quantitative disclosure the matrix will display the following information:

- The principle number;
- The requirement of that principle (as specified in the standards);
- The quantitative disclosure as it applies to the CCP¹;
- The frequency period of updating this disclosure; and
- The period for which this disclosure relates

The common templates (csv files) and supporting documentation can be accessed via the following link:

https://www2.asx.com.au/about/regulation/quantitative-disclosures-for-asx-clear

¹ All values are provided in Australian dollars unless otherwise indicated

Principle 4 – Credit Risk

		Requir	ement	
4.1	regated by clearing service, split (a) pre-funded i. own capital that form contributions) ii. aggregate participant iii. other (b) committed i. own/parent funds that ii. aggregate participant iii. aggregate participant of participant defaults iv. other	by: as part of the default waterfall (for contributions (both amount requ t are committed to address a par commitments to address an initia commitments to replenish the de a) after the initial participant defa t the end of this document for ac		ore, alongside, or after, member sted, where different) cipant defaults) und of participant defaults) ent participant default (or round
			osure	
		rces of up to \$550m. This is com on recovery assessments from its	prised of a paid in default fund tha participants of up to \$300m.	at has \$250m paid in resources
	In the event of a participant defa		he margins of the defaulting parti	cipant together with any
		ASX Clea Total Default Re	-	
		Defaulter's Margins and A	dditional Margins	
	\$7:	5m Restricted Capita	Application	
	\$17	8.5m Equity	Order of	
	Upto	\$300m Recovery Asses	sments	7
		Promisso	esources contributed by ASX by Resources	4
		ASA CIEdi disu iids d 3230 Millior	liquidity facility from ASX Limited	
	Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020

		Requi	rement				
4.2	KCCP Kccp need only be reported by those CCPs which are, or seek to be, a "qualifying CCP" under relevant law.						
	[Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details] Disclosure						
	The KccP is a hypothetical capital requirement for a CCP, calculated for the purpose of determining the capital requirement on bank clearing member default fund contributions. A CCP's hypothetical capital requirement is driven by its counterparty credit risk exposures from its clearing members per APRA Prudential Standard APS180.						
	supervisor). As a qualifying CCP,	The KccP does not represent the actual default resources for a CCP (the actual default resources are determined by the CCP's supervisor). As a qualifying CCP, ASX is required to calculate the default resources on bank clearing member default fund contributions on a monthly basis.					
	The Ксс р (Hypothetical capital) f \$250m.	or ASX Clear as at the reporting p	period was \$0 compared to actual	default resources held of			
Update Frequency: Quarterly Last Updated: 30 Septem							
		Requi	rement				
4.3	Value of pre-funded default resources (excluding initial and retained variation margin) held for each clearing service, in total and split by:						
4.3	-	ources (excluding initial and reta	ined variation margin) held for ea	ach clearing service, in total and			
+.0	 split by: Cash deposited at a centra Cash deposited at other centra 	I bank of issue of the currency co entral banks commercial banks (consisting of at commercial banks : bonds					

Amounts should be reported both pre-haircut (i.e. at market value) and at post-haircut value.

Disclosure

Pre-funded default resources of \$250m (repayable upon demand) are provided in cash from ASX. These funds together with margins from ASX Clear and ASX Clear (Futures), default fund contributions lodged by participants of ASX Clear (Futures) and the CCPs own funds are combined into one portfolio and invested into various assets through a Trust.

As the default resources cannot be individually assigned to specific asset classes, a general allocation has been made based on the proportion of the default resources to the total portfolio and this % has been applied to each asset class.

Investment	Pre Haircut (m)	Post Haircut (m)
Cash		
Cash deposit at central bank of issue of currency	2.24	2.24

Unsecured cash deposit at commercial banks	4.24	4.24
	4.24	4.24
Investment	Pre Haircut (m)	Post Haircut (m)
Non- Cash		
Domestic Sovereign Government Bonds	-	-
Australian State issued securities	-	-
Bank issued securities	76.35	76.35
Total	290.00	290.00

		Requirement
4.4	1) State wh resource	ether the CCP is subject to a minimum "Cover 1" or "Cover 2" requirement in relation to total pre-funded default s.
		clearing service, state the number of business days within which the CCP assumes it will close out the default when ng credit exposures that would potentially need to be covered by the default fund.
	the defa	clearing service, what is the estimated largest aggregate stress loss (in excess of initial margin) that would be caused by ult of any single participant and its affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants) in extreme but market conditions?
		ne number of business days, if any, on which the above amount exceeded actual pre-funded default resources (in excess margin) and by how much.
		clearing service, what was the <i>actual</i> largest aggregate credit exposure (in excess of initial margin) to any single nt and its affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants)?
	the defa	clearing service, what is the estimated largest aggregate stress loss (in excess of initial margin) that would be caused by ult of any two participants and their affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants) in extreme but market conditions?
		ne number of business days, if any, on which the above amount exceeded actual pre-funded default resources (in excess margin) and by how much.
		clearing service, what was the <i>actual</i> largest aggregate credit exposure (in excess of initial margin) to any <i>two</i> nts and their affiliates (including transactions cleared for indirect participants)?
	[Refer to th	e explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details]
		Disclosure
	Ref	Result
	1)	ASX Clear is subject to a "Cover 2" requirement
	2)	ASX Clear assumes that it will close out a default within 3 business days
	3)	Peak day amount in the previous 12 months (Cover 1)\$147.54m*Average over the previous 12 months (Cover 1)\$83.01m*

4)	The peak amount in the previous 12 months of \$147.5 did not exce \$250m.	eed the pre-funded d	efault resources of
5)	Peak day amount in the previous 12 months (Cover 1) Average over the previous 12 months (Cover 1)		\$109.69m \$5.87m
6)	Peak day amount in the previous 12 months (Cover 2) Average over the previous 12 months (Cover 2)		\$237.62m* \$135.03m*
7)	The peak amount in the previous 12 months of \$237.6 did not exc \$250m.	eed the pre-funded d	efault resources of
	Peak day amount in the previous 12 months (Cover 2)		\$169.59m
8)	Average over the previous 12 months (Cover 2)		\$7.38m
8)	Average over the previous 12 months (Cover 2) * Exposures are net of additional initial margins (AIMs) held.		\$7.38m

Principle 5 – Collateral

	Requirement							
5.1 Assets eligible as initial margin, and the respective haircuts applied								
	[Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details]							
	Disclosure Subject to approval and on such conditions as ASX Clear may determine from time to time, the following may be provided in respe							
							wing may be provided in respect	
	of margin:							
	Instrument		ved Cover		Valuation Haircu	it	Provided for Initial Margin	
	Cash Cover	AUD Cash			N/A		Additional Initial Margin	
	Cash	Specific Cove			N/A			
	Equities	S&P / ASX 20			d at 15%, 20% ar		Initial Margin	
		SPDR S&P / /			ered at 15% and 2			
	Please refer to the https://www2.as						cuts.	
	Updat	e Frequency:	When chang	ges made		Last Updated:	30 September 2020	
[
					rement			
5.2	Assets eligible for from 5.1)	r pre-funded p	articipant contribu	utions to the d	efault resources	, and the respect	tive haircuts applied (if different	
				Discl	osure			
-	The ASX Clear def	ault resources	do not contain an	y pre-funded p	articipant contri	butions.		
	Updat	e Frequency:	When chang	ges made		Last Updated:	l: 30 September 2020	
				Requir	ements			
5.3		nce interval tar	lease state the: geted through the dation period for t					
	3. look-ba	ck period used	for testing the ha	ircuts,				
		mber of days du ed the haircut o		k period on wh	ich the fall in val	ue during the ass	sumed holding/liquidation period	
	[Refer to the expl			ocument for a	ditional details]			
				Discl	osure			
	Back testing of Co	ollateral haircut	s is performed on	a quarterly ba	sis covering the	previous 12 mont	ths.	
	Ref Iten	n			Res	sult		
		fidence Interva	-		99			
			Liquidation Perio	d	3 days bus		_	
		k-back Period			262 days bu			
			ceeded the Hairco		14 verage of 99.75%	1		
		e Frequency:	Quarte			Last Updated:	30 September 2020	

Principle 6 – Margin

Initial Margin

		Re	quirement				
6.1	For each clearing service, total initial margin <i>required</i> , split by house and client (or combined total if not segregated)						
	<u> </u>	For each clearing service, state whether initial margin for the positions of indirect participants must be provided for each indirect participant's own position (gross), or for the net position of a group of indirect participants ("net" or "net omnibus")					
	[Refer to the explanatory note at the e	[Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details]					
		D	isclosure				
	ASX Clear faces each clearing participa each client has their own individual Cli		use) for all Cash Market transactions. I	For Exchange Traded Options			
	Туре	(m)					
	Cash Market - House (Gross)	\$433.86					
	ETO - House (Gross)	\$159.17					
	ETO – Client (Gross)	\$1,307.61					
	Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020			

	Requirement
6.2	For each clearing service, total initial margin <i>held</i> , split by house and client (if segregated).
	For each of the overall house and client totals (or for just the overall total posted, if house and client are not segregated), the amounts of:
	 Cash deposited at a central bank of issue of the currency concerned Cash deposited at other central banks Secured cash deposited at commercial banks (consisting of reverse repos of Australian and State Government bonds only) Unsecured cash deposited at commercial banks Non-cash sovereign government bonds
	 Sovereign government bonds domestic other agency bonds state/municipal bonds corporate bonds corporate bonds equities commodities gold other mutual funds / UCITs other (please provide explanation of type of asset) Amounts should be reported both pre-haircut (i.e. at market value) and at post-haircut value.
	[Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details]
	Disclosure
	Cash margins and default fund contributions lodged by participants of ASX Clear and ASX Clear (Futures) and the CCPs own funds are combined into one portfolio and invested into various assets through a Trust.

As the initial margins cannot be individually assigned to specific asset classes, a general allocation has been made based on the proportion of the initial margin lodged to the total portfolio and this % has been applied to each asset class.

This table also includes non-cash collateral (including any excess collateral) that has been lodged by any of the clearing participants.

	House		Cli	Client		
Investments	Pre Haircut (m)	Post Haircut (m)	Pre Haircut (m)	Post Haircut (m		
Cash						
Cash deposit at central bank of issue of currency	3.73	3.73	5.35	5.3		
Secured cash deposit at commercial banks (reverse repos of Government and State bonds only)	346.07	346.07	495.53	495.5		
Unsecured cash deposit at commercial banks	7.09	7.09	10.15	10.:		
Non-Cash						
Australian State issued securities	127.55	127.55	739.90	582.		
Equities	22.96	18.37	182.64	182.6		
Total	507.40	502.81	1,433.57	1,276.0		

Update Frequency:

Quarterly Last Updated: 30 September 2020

_	Requirement						
6.3	Initial margin rates on individual contracts, where the CCP sets such rates						
	[Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details]						
	Disclosure						
	Refer to the link below for the ASX Clear SPAN margin parameters and Cash Market margin parameters						
	https://www2.asx.com.au/about/regulation/quantitative-disclosures-for-asx-clear						
	Update Frequency:	When changes made	Last Updated:	30 September 2020			

		Requirement							
6.4	<i>·</i> · ·	Type of initial margin model used (e.g. portfolio simulation or risk aggregation) for each clearing service and the key model design parameters for each initial margin model applied to that clearing service – key parameters including, but not limited to:							
	 (i) single-tailed confidence level targeted; (ii) sample/data look-back period for calibrating the model; (iii) adjustments or scalars or weighting, if any, applied to historical data (e.g. to reflect changes in volatility); (iv) close-out/holding periods by product (or, if varying, contract type); (v) for risk aggregation models, the margin rate per contract and details of the offsets between different contracts [e.g. for SPAN style models this might include inter-month spread charges and inter-contract spread credits]; (vi) the frequency of parameter reviews. [Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details] 								
	Disclosure								
	Re	f Item	SPAN (Derivatives)	HSVaR (Equities)					
	(i) Single-tailed confidence level targeted	99.7%	99.7%					

both short and long term periods (60 then a portfolio add on factor of 50% is	(ii)	sample/data look-back period for calibrating the model	1 Year		aR = 502 days Rate = 1 Year
Image:			back periods considered incorporating both short and long term periods (60	calculated on 99% confidence interval ar then a portfolio add on factor of 50% is added to construct a reliable estimate of	
Periods Single Stock = 5 days Flat Rate ASX Top 200 = 2 days Flat Rate ASX Next 300 = 2 days Flat Rate ASX Next 300 = 2 days Flat Rate Interest Rate Securities = 3 days Flat Rate Warrants = 3 days Flat Rate Non-All Ordinaries = 3 days (v) Offsets between different contracts https://www2.asx.com.au/about/regul ation/quantitative-disclosures-for-asx- N/A				for statistical uncorreliable estimate	ertainty and construct a of the desired 99.7%
different contracts ation/quantitative-disclosures-for-asx- clear	(iv)		,	Flat Rate ASX Top Flat Rate ASX Nex Flat Rate Interest Flat Rate Warrant	o 200 = 2 days ct 300 = 2 days Rate Securities = 3 days ts = 3 days
(vi) Frequency of reviews Monthly Monthly	(v)		ation/quantitative-disclosures-for-asx-	N/A	
	(vi)	Frequency of reviews	Monthly		Monthly

			Requirement					
6.5	Results of back-testing of initial margin (where breaches of initial margin occurred). At a minimum, this should include, for each clearing service and each initial margin model applied to that clearing service:							
	 (a) Number of times over the past twelve months that margin coverage held against any account fell below the actual marked-to-market exposure of that member account – based on daily back-testing results* (b) Number of observations (i.e. number of accounts multiplied by number of days covered in the back test) (c) Achieved coverage level, i.e. [(b) – (a)]/(b) * Specify if measured intraday/continuously or only once a day. If once a day, specify at what time of day. Where breaches of initial margin coverage (as defined in 6.5(a)) have occurred, report on size of uncovered exposure. 							
		[Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details]						
			Disclosure					
	Ref	ETO's	Cash Market					
	(a)	9,800	37					
	(b)	1,334,081	8,034					
	(c)	99.27%	99.54%					
	Peak	\$52.30m	\$40.56m					
	Average \$0.10m \$6.70m							
	Update Frequency:	Quarte	rly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020			

Margin Calls

		Requirement					
6.6	Average total variation margin paid to the CCP by participants each business day.						
	[Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details]						
	Disclosure						
	Average total variation margin paid to the CCP by participants each business day over the quarter. \$33.78m						
	Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020			

		Requir	rement			
6.7	Maximum total variation margin paid to the CCP on any given business day over the period.					
	Disclosure					
	Maximum total variation margin paid to the CCP on any given business day over the quarter. \$200.12m					
	Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020		

		Requirement						
6.8	Maximum initial margin call per clearing participant on any given business day over the period.							
	Disclosure							
	Maximum initial margin call per clearing participant on any given business day over the quarter. \$132.72m							
	Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020				

Principle 7 – Liquidity Risk

Size servi (a) (b) (c) (d)	and composition of qualifying liquid resources for each clearing service (or at age	Cover 2'					
servi (a) (b) (c) (d)		State whether the clearing service maintains sufficient liquid resources to 'Cover 1' or 'Cover 2'.					
	vice level) – for each relevant currency – split by: Cash deposited at a central bank of issue of the currency concerned Cash deposited at other central banks Secured cash deposited at commercial banks (consisting of reverse repos of Aust Unsecured cash deposited at commercial banks	-	-				
(e) (f) (g) (h)	be provided by the CCP if dra ling collateral/security); y available and convertible i ible market conditions;						
State	te whether the CCP has routine access to central bank liquidity or facilities.						
 If, in using qualifying liquid resources the CCP is required or allowed to give priority to meeting certain payment obligation provide or reference: the schedule of payments or priority for allocating payments, if such exists; any applicable rule, policy, procedure, and governance arrangement around such decision making. 							
As al into	Disclosure all cash received from both clearing houses together with the CCPs own funds are co o various assets through a Trust, a general allocation has been made based on the p aring house to the total portfolio and this % has been applied to the relevant asset o	roportion of the portfolio lod					
As al into clear ASX (all cash received from both clearing houses together with the CCPs own funds are co o various assets through a Trust, a general allocation has been made based on the p aring house to the total portfolio and this % has been applied to the relevant asset o Clear maintains sufficient liquid resources for Cover 2.	roportion of the portfolio lod lass.	ged by eac				
As al into clear ASX (In	all cash received from both clearing houses together with the CCPs own funds are conversed from both clearing houses together with the CCPs own funds are conversed on the paring house to the total portfolio and this % has been applied to the relevant asset of a Clear maintains sufficient liquid resources for Cover 2.	roportion of the portfolio lod lass.					
As al into clear ASX (In Ca	all cash received from both clearing houses together with the CCPs own funds are consistent of various assets through a Trust, a general allocation has been made based on the paring house to the total portfolio and this % has been applied to the relevant asset of Clear maintains sufficient liquid resources for Cover 2.	roportion of the portfolio lod lass.	ged by eac				
As al into clear ASX o In Ca Se	all cash received from both clearing houses together with the CCPs own funds are conversed from both clearing houses together with the CCPs own funds are conversed on the paring house to the total portfolio and this % has been applied to the relevant asset of a Clear maintains sufficient liquid resources for Cover 2.	roportion of the portfolio lod lass.	ged by eac Value (m)				
As al into s clear ASX o In Ca Se St	all cash received from both clearing houses together with the CCPs own funds are consistent of a trust, a general allocation has been made based on the paring house to the total portfolio and this % has been applied to the relevant asset of a clear maintains sufficient liquid resources for Cover 2.	roportion of the portfolio lod lass.	ged by eac Value (m) 11.32				
As al into clear ASX 0 In Ca St U H	all cash received from both clearing houses together with the CCPs own funds are consistent at the total portfolio and this % has been applied to the relevant asset of a clear maintains sufficient liquid resources for Cover 2. Anvestments Cash deposited at central bank of issue of the currency Secured cash deposited at commercial banks (reverse repos of Government and State bonds only)	roportion of the portfolio lod lass.	ged by eac Value (m) 11.32 1,048.77				

	Requirement						
7.2	Size and composition of any sup above.	Size and composition of any supplementary liquidity risk resources for each clearing service above those qualifying liquid resources above.					
	[Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details]						
	Disclosure						
	There are no supplementary liquidity risk resources beyond what has been detailed in principle 7.1 for ASX Clear.						
	Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020			

				Requi	rement		
F	For each clearing	g service (or at the	aggregate CCP lev	vel if not ma	naged at clea	ring service level):	
2 3 4 5	caused by the but plausible (2) Report the nu 7.1, and availa 3) What is the a cleared for ind 4) What is the es that would b participants) i 5) Report the nu currency (as id	default of any sing market conditions? imber of business d able at the point the ctual largest intrada direct participants) stimated largest sar e caused by the c in extreme but plau imber of business d dentified in 7.1 and	le participant and lays, if any, on wh e breach occurred ay and multiday pa over the past twe ne-day and, wher lefault of any sir isible market cond ays, if any, on whi available at the p	its affiliates nich the abov d), and by ho ayment oblig elve months? e relevant, ir ngle particip ditions? ich the abov point the bre	(including tra ve amount ex w much. (ation of a sin ntraday and n ant and its a e amounts ex ach occurred	nsactions cleared for i ceeded its qualifying l gle participant and its nultiday payment oblig affiliates (including tr ceeded its qualifying l), and by how much.	bligation in total that would b indirect participants) in extrem iquid resources (identified as i affiliates (including transaction gation <i>in each relevant currend</i> ansactions cleared for indirect iquid resources in each relevan
[Refer to the exp	planatory note at th	ne end of this doci	ument for ac	ditional deta	nils]	
				Discl	osure		
	Ref		Result				
	Ref 1)		\$1,906.12m*				
	1)		\$1,906.12m* 0 days*				
	1) 2)		\$1,906.12m* 0 days* \$0.0m*				
	1) 2) 3)	Cover C	\$1,906.12m* 0 days* \$0.0m* Peak: \$69.97m 1: \$1,906.12m*				
	1) 2) 3) 4)	Cover C C C	\$1,906.12m* 0 days* \$0.0m* Peak: \$69.97m 1: \$1,906.12m* 2: \$3,157.38m* Cover 1: 0 days* Cover 1: \$0.0m*				
	1) 2) 3) 4) 5) * Would be cover	Cover C C C C	\$1,906.12m* 0 days* \$0.0m* Peak: \$69.97m 1: \$1,906.12m* 2: \$3,157.38m* Cover 1: 0 days* Cover 1: \$0.0m* Cover 2: 0 days* Cover 2: \$0.0m*	he use of the	Offsetting Tr	ransaction Arrangeme	nts (refer 7.1)

Principle 12 – Exchange of Value Settlement System

Requirement 12.1 Percentage of settlements by value effected using a DvP, DvD or PvP settlement mechanism [Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details] Disclosure Only Cash Market transactions are settled through a Delivery vs. Payment (DvP) settlement mechanism as Exchange Trade Options are settled via the margining process. Cash Market transactions are novated to the Clear immediately after bid/offer matched on the trading platform, or (for r trades) transaction is recorded by the market operator ² . Then on the evening of Trade Date +1 (T+1) the novated transaction netted ³ per security for settlement on T+2.	
[Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details] Disclosure Only Cash Market transactions are settled through a Delivery vs. Payment (DvP) settlement mechanism as Exchange Trad Options are settled via the margining process. Cash Market transactions are novated to the Clear immediately after bid/offer matched on the trading platform, or (for r trades) transaction is recorded by the market operator ² . Then on the evening of Trade Date +1 (T+1) the novated transaction	
Disclosure Only Cash Market transactions are settled through a Delivery vs. Payment (DvP) settlement mechanism as Exchange Trace Options are settled via the margining process. Cash Market transactions are novated to the Clear immediately after bid/offer matched on the trading platform, or (for r trades) transaction is recorded by the market operator ² . Then on the evening of Trade Date +1 (T+1) the novated transaction	
Only Cash Market transactions are settled through a Delivery vs. Payment (DvP) settlement mechanism as Exchange Trad Options are settled via the margining process. Cash Market transactions are novated to the Clear immediately after bid/offer matched on the trading platform, or (for r trades) transaction is recorded by the market operator ² . Then on the evening of Trade Date +1 (T+1) the novated transact	
Options are settled via the margining process. Cash Market transactions are novated to the Clear immediately after bid/offer matched on the trading platform, or (for r trades) transaction is recorded by the market operator ² . Then on the evening of Trade Date +1 (T+1) the novated transac	
trades) transaction is recorded by the market operator ² . Then on the evening of Trade Date +1 (T+1) the novated transaction	ed
The balance of transactions include the movement of stock between clearing participants and their clients to facilitate the settlement of the DvP transactions.	tions are
Type Percentage	
DvP 100%	
DvD N/A	
PvP N/A	
Update Frequency: Quarterly Last Updated: 30 September	.020

			Requir	rement					
12.2	Percentage of	settlements by volu	me effected using a DvP, DvD c	or PvP settlement mechanism					
	[Refer to the e	[Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details]							
	Disclosure								
	Options are se Cash Market t trades) transa	ettled via the margin ransactions are nova	ing process. ated to ASX Clear immediately a the market operator. Then on t	Payment (DvP) settlement mechai after bid/offer matched on the tra he evening of Trade Date +1 (T+1	ding platform, or (for reported				
	Туре	Percentage							
	DvP	100%							
	DvD	N/A							
	ΡνΡ	N/A]						
	Up	date Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020				

² In either case the transaction must subsequently be submitted to ASX Clear and validated for eligibility, if the transaction is eligible for clearing, the transaction is novated with effect from this point, if it is not, the transaction is rejected.

³ Excluding Broker / Broker transactions that have been novated but isolated from netting due to a corporate action etc.

Principle 13 – Default Rules and Procedures

		Requir	ement	
13.1	CCPs are encouraged, subject to related to defaults, such as:	legal constraints on timing and co	ontent, to disclose as soon as pract	icable quantitative information
	Proportion of client position	resources used to cover losses	e defaults may also be helpful.	
		Discl	osure	
	There were no ASX Clear Clearin	g Participant defaults in the repo	rting period.	
	Refer to the following link for ar	overview on default manageme	nt:	
	https://www2.asx.com.au/m	arkets/clearing-and-settleme	nt-services/asx-clear/risk-mana	agement
	Update Frequency:	Ad Hoc	Last Updated:	30 September 2020

Principle 14 – Segregation and Portability

			Requir	ement	
14.1	Split, by clearin	g service, of tota	l client positions held in:		
	(b) omnibus(c) legally se	•	ints, other than LSOC accounts (se erationally comingled (LSOC) accou		
	as a share of no	otional values cle	ared or of the settlement value of	securities transactions.	
	[Refer to the e	xplanatory note a	at the end of this document for ad	ditional details]	
			Discl	osure	
	ASX Clear oper	ates a principal to	o principal model for Cash Market	and Exchange Traded Options.	
	Ű	sh Market all pos	SX Clear has an account structure sitions are registered into the nam		00
	Ref	Result			
	(a)	100% (1)			
	(b)	0			
	(c)	0			
	(d)	N/A (2)			
		xchange Traded comments abov	Options only e regarding Cash Market		
	Upc	late Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020

Principle 15 – General Business Risk

		Requir	ement	
15.1	(a) Value of liquid net assets f(b) Six months of current oper			
	[Refer to the explanatory note a	t the end of this document for ad	ditional details]	
		Discl	osure	
	 (a) Capital to cover General Bu assigned for ASX Clear busin (b) \$121.26m* 	-	company level and not the indivic	lual clearing house. \$71.00m is
	*Disclosures are based on amou (Futures), for the financial year e		liaries (the group), which includes	ASX Clear and ASX Clear
	Update Frequency:	Annual	Last Updated:	30 June 2020
		Requir	rement	
15.2	Financial disclosures: including,	but not limited to,		
	 total revenue, total expenditure, profits, total assets, total liabilities. 			
	Explain if collateral posted by cle	earing participants is held on or o	ff the CCP's balance sheet.	
			osure	
			for the provision of operational ser ot have any meaningful revenues o	
	The disclosures below are based Clear (Futures), for the financial		its subsidiaries (the group), which	includes ASX Clear and ASX
	Total Revenue Total Expenditure Net Profits before Tax Net Profits after Tax	\$1,095.29m \$374.40m \$720.89m \$498.66m		
	Total Assets Total Liabilities	\$17,370.03m \$13,649.64m		
	Collateral posted by participants	to cover ASX Clear margin obliga	tions are held off the balance she	et.
	Update Frequency:	Annual	Last Updated:	30 June 2020

	Requirement
15.3	 Income breakdowns: (a) percentage of total income that comes from fees related to provision of clearing services; (b) percentage of total income that comes from the reinvestment (or rehypothecation) of assets provided by clearing participants.
	Disclosure
	(a) % of total income from fees related to provision of clearing services: 19% (1)

 (b) % of total income from the reinvestment of cash margins: 10% (2)

 (1) Clearing fees for derivatives are bundled with trading and settlement fees. A portion of the total fees charged for trading, clearing and settlement has been allocated to clearing activities based on estimates by management.

 (2) The % of total income from reinvestment of cash margins disclosures are based on amounts for ASX Limited and its subsidiaries (the group), which includes ASX Clear and ASX Clear (Futures), for the financial year ended 30 June 2020. Re-hypothecation of collateral is not permitted.

 Update Frequency:
 Annual
 Last Updated:
 30 June 2020

Principle 16 – Custody and Investment Risk

		Requir	ement	
16.1		eceived from participants, regard I margin or default fund contribu	ess of the form in which it is held tion	, deposited or invested, split by
		Discl	osure	
	\$1,198.27m received from ASX (Clear Clearing Participants as Initi	al Margin.	
	Note – There are no Clearing Pa	rticipant contributions in the ASX	Clear default fund.	
	Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020


	Requirement
16.2	How the total cash received from participants (i.e. the combined total of initial margin and default fund contributions in 16.1) is held/deposited/invested, including:
	 percentage of this total participant cash held as cash deposits (consisting of reverse repos of Australian and State Government bonds only); further split into: percentage held:
	 sovereign government bonds; of which: domestic; other; agency bonds; state/municipal bonds; other instruments (please describe); percentage split by currency of these securities - local currency, USD, EUR, other. Also: weighted average maturity of these securities

Provide an estimate of the risk on the investment portfolio (exclue VaR, or equivalent)		51(3) (33/0	
State if the CCP investment policy sets a limit on the proportion counterparty, and the size of that limit.	ent policy sets a limit on the proportion of the investment portfolio that may be allocated to a sin e of that limit.		
State the number of times over the previous quarter in which this I	imit has been exceeded.		
Disclos	Sure		
Margins and default funding lodged by participants of ASX Clear an into one portfolio and invested into various assets.	d ASX Clear (Futures) and the CCPs own funds	are com	
As the total cash received from Participants cannot be individually made based on the proportion of the cash received from Participar asset class.			
The below disclosures include excess cash received from participan	its over and above their initial margin requirer	nent.	
Investment		Percen	
Central bank of issue of the currency deposited		0.77	
Secured cash deposits at commercial banks (reverse repos of Go	overnment and State bonds only)	71.44	
Unsecured cash deposits at commercial banks		1.46	
% of total participant cas	sh held as cash deposits (incl. reverse repo):	73.6	
Domestic Sovereign Government Bonds		0.00	
Australian State issued securities		26.33	
% of	total participant cash invested in securities:	26.3	
Weighted average maturity of these securities (WAM)		80.88	
Estimated risk on the Investment portfolio (VaR = 2 day holding	period calculated at 99% confidence)	\$210.	
Counterparty	Limit (\$) per Counterparty		
Australian Government	Unlimited		
State Government - New South Wales Treasury Corporation	\$1,600m		
State Government - Treasury Corporation of Victoria	\$1,600m		
State Government - Queensland Treasury Corporation	\$1,200m		
State Government - Western Australia Treasury Corporation	\$1,200m		
State Government - South Australian Government Financing Authority	\$800m		
State Government - Tasmanian Public Finance Corporation	\$400m		
New Zealand Government	NZD\$250m		
	NZD\$75m		
New Zealand Deposit-taking Institution			
	\$75m		
New Zealand Deposit-taking Institution	\$75m \$75m		

Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020

		Requir	ement	
16.3	Rehypothecation of participant	assets (i.e. non-cash) by the CCP v	where allowed, split by initial mar	gin and default fund:
		/1 /	veek; over one week and up to on years);	e month; over one month and
		Discl	osure	
	The value of participants' non-ca permitted.	ash collateral re-hypothecated as	at quarter end was nil as re-hypot	thecation of collateral is not
	Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020

Principle 17 – Operational Risk



				Requirement		
17.2	Actual availability	of the core syst	em(s) over the previ	ous twelve month perio	d.	
				Disclosure		
	All ASX Clear core	systems have h	ad 100% availability	over the last 12 months		
			ASX Clear – Core S	Systems		
		System		Availability		
		CHESS (Cleari	ng)	100.00%		
		DCS (Clearing)	100.00%		
		RAZOR (Marg	ining)	100.00%		
		SPAN (Margir	ning)	100.00%		
	Updat	e Frequency:	Quarterly		Last Updated:	30 September 2020
				-		

	Requirement
17.3	Total number and duration of failures affecting the core system(s) involved in clearing over the previous twelve month period
	Disclosure
	There were no failures with the ASX Clear core systems for the last 12 months

System	Number of Failures	Duration (Mins)
CHESS (Clearing)	0	0
DCS (Clearing)	0	0
RAZOR (Margining)	0	0
SPAN (Margining)	0	0

				Require	ement		
17.4	Recovery time objective(s) (e.g. within two hours)						
				Disclo	sure		
	All ASX Clear core systems are subject to a 2 hour recovery time objective.						
		ASX Clear – Core Systems					
		System		Recovery Time	Objective		
		CHESS (Clear	ing)	2 Hou	rs		
		DCS (Clearin	g)	2 Hou	rs		
	RAZOR (Margining	gining)	2 Hou	rs			
		SPAN (Margi	ning)	2 Hou	rs		
	Update	e Frequency:	Quart	erly		Last Updated:	30 September 2020

Principle 18 – Access and Participation requirements

	Requirements							
18.1	Number of clearing members, by	clearing service, split by:						
	 category of membership (e.g. direct clearing member, general clearing member); type of participant (central bank, CCP, bank, other); and domestic or foreign participants. [Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details]							
		Disclosure						
	On ASX Clear there are two categ	ories of Clearing Participants, "Dire	ect: and "General":					
	"Direct Participant" means a Participant which is admitted by ASX Clear to clear a category of Market Transaction for itself, its own Clients and Market Participants that are Wholly-Owned Group Entities and their clients.							
	"General Participant" means a Pa	articipant which is admitted by ASX	Clear to clear a category of	of Market Transaction for	itself, its			
	own Clients, other Participants ar	nd their Clients and Market Particip	oants and their Clients.					
	Category of Membe	ership Type of Participant	Domestic	Foreign				
	Direct	Bank	0	0				
	Direct	Bank Subsidiary	5	0				
	Direct	Investment Bank	7	0				
	Direct	Domestic	6	0				
	Direct	International	2	0				
	Direct	Suspended	1	0				
	<u></u>	Total Direct Participants	21	0				
	General	Bank	1	1				
	General	Bank Subsidiary	5	0				
	General	Investment Bank	2	0				
	General	Domestic	2	0				
	General	International	1	0				
	General	Suspended	0	0				
		Total General Participants	11	1				
		Grand Total	32	1				
	Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updat	ed: 30 September	[.] 2020			

	Requirement						
18.2	For each clearing service with ten or more members, but fewer than 25 members:						
	- Percentage of the top five clearing m	embers by the largest	open positions, includin	g both hous	se and client, in aggregate		
	For each clearing service with 25 or more members:						
	- Percentage of the top five and ten clearing members by the largest open positions, including both house and client, in aggregate						
	[Refer to the explanatory note at the end of	of this document for ac	ditional details]				
		Discl	osure				
	As detailed in 18.1 at the time of the upda largest five and ten clearing participants w		aring Participants. Perce	entage of op	pen positions held by the		
		Largest 5 Clea	aring Participants	Largest	10 Clearing Participants		
	Cash Market - Average	42	2.78%		73.89%		
	Cash Market - Peak end of day	55	5.55%		82.82%		
	ETO – Average 64.52% 86.34%						
	ETO – Peak end of day 65.99% 87.01%						
	Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last L	Jpdated:	30 September 2020		

		Requirement				
3.3	For each clearing service with ten or more members, but fewer than 25 members:					
	- Percentage of the largest five cleari	ng members by initial margin, including both h	nouse and client, in aggregate			
	For each clearing service with 25 or more	members:				
	- Percentage of the largest five and to	en clearing members by initial margin, includir	ng both house and client, in aggregate			
	[Refer to the explanatory note at the end	of this document for additional details]				
	Disclosure					
		Disclosure				
	As detailed in 18.1 at the time of the upd largest five and ten clearing participants of the second	ate ASX Clear had 33 Clearing Participants. Per were:				
	largest five and ten clearing participants	ate ASX Clear had 33 Clearing Participants. Per were: Largest 5 Clearing Participants	Largest 10 Clearing Participants			
	largest five and ten clearing participants of Cash Market – Average	ate ASX Clear had 33 Clearing Participants. Per were: Largest 5 Clearing Participants 42.68%	Largest 10 Clearing Participants 68.78%			
	largest five and ten clearing participants	ate ASX Clear had 33 Clearing Participants. Per were: Largest 5 Clearing Participants	Largest 10 Clearing Participants			
	largest five and ten clearing participants Cash Market – Average Cash Market - Peak end of day	ate ASX Clear had 33 Clearing Participants. Per were: Largest 5 Clearing Participants 42.68% 54.68%	Largest 10 Clearing Participants 68.78% 76.22%			
	largest five and ten clearing participants of Cash Market – Average Cash Market - Peak end of day ETO – Average	ate ASX Clear had 33 Clearing Participants. Per were: Largest 5 Clearing Participants 42.68% 54.68% 62.10%	Largest 10 Clearing Participants 68.78% 76.22% 82.81%			

	Requirement
18.4	For each segregated default fund with ten or more members, but fewer than 25 members:
	- Percentage of participant contributions to the default fund contributed by largest five clearing members in aggregate
	For each segregated default fund with 25 or more members: - Percentage of participant contributions to the default fund contributed by largest five and ten clearing members in aggregate

[Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details]					
Disclosure					
At the time of the update the ASX	At the time of the update the ASX Clear default fund of \$250m contained no ASX Clear Clearing Participant contributions.				
Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020		

Principle 19 – Tiered Participation arrangements

				Requi	rement		
19.3	1 Measu	Measures of concentration of client clearing:					
	1. N	1. Number of clients (if known)					
	2. N	lumber	of direct members t	hat clear for clients			
	 Per cent of client transactions by clearing service (by total gross notional for derivatives or total cleared value of securities transactions or similar) attributable to the top five clearing members (if the CCP has ten or more clearing members) and top ten clearing members (if the CCP has 25 or more clearing members) [Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details] 						
				Discl	osure		
	F	Ref	Result				
		1.	44 ASX Market Part 2 CHI-X Trading Par	icipants, and ticipants that clear through a di	rect member		
		2.	10 Direct members	clear for the above			
		3.	Top 5 = 24.21% Top 10 = 30.02%				
		U	pdate Frequency:	Quarterly		Last Updated:	30 September 2020

Principle 20 – FMI Links

Interoperability

	Requirement						
20.1	Value of trades cleared through each link, by clearing service – as a share of total trade values/total notional values cleared in that service						
	[Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details]						
	Disclosure						
	ASX Clear has the following FMI	Links:					
	 ASX Settlement Pty Limited; and Austraclear Limited 						
	ASX Clear does not transact through either of these FMI Links.						
	Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020			

	Requirement						
20.2	Initial margin or equivalent financial resources <i>provided to</i> each linked CCP by the CCP to cover the potential future exposure of the linked CCP on contracts cleared across link						
	Disclosure Not Applicable						
	Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020			

_	Requirement						
20.3	Initial margin or equivalent financial resources <i>collected from</i> each linked CCP to cover potential future exposure to the linked CCP on contracts cleared across link (at market value and post-haircut)						
		Discl	osure				
	Not Applicable						
	Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020			

		Requir	rement				
20.4	Results of back-testing of coverage of initial margin or equivalent financial resources on trades cleared through each link. At a minimum this should include:						
	 (a) Number of times over the past twelve months that coverage provided by margin and equivalent financial resource against each linked CCP fell below the actual marked-to-market exposure to that linked CCP – based on daily back results* (b) Number of observations (i.e. number of accounts multiplied by number of days covered in the back test) (c) Achieved coverage level i.e. [(b) – (a)]/(b) *specify if measured intraday/continuously or only once a day. If once a day, at what time of day. 						
	Disclosure						
	Not Applicable						
	Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020			

_	Requirement						
20.5 Additional pre-funded financial resources (if any) beyond initial margin and equivalent financial resources provide CCP, that are available to the linked CCP to cover exposures to the CCP and whether part of, additional to, or set standard default fund (please specify)							
		Discl	osure				
	Not Applicable						
	Update Frequency: Quarterly Last Updated: 30 September 2020						
	opuale Frequency.	Quarterly	Last Opdated.	SU September 2020			

Requirement 20.6 Additional pre-funded financial resources (if any) beyond initial margin and equivalent financial resources collected from each linked CCP, that are available to the CCP to cover exposures to the linked CCP and whether part of, additional to, or separate from the standard default fund (please specify) Disclosure Not Applicable Update Frequency: Quarterly Last Updated: 30 September 2020

Cross Margining

		Requir	rement	
20.7			, as a percentage of total trade valu cross margining, as a percentage c	-
		osure		
	Update Frequency:	Quarterly	Last Updated:	30 September 2020

Principle 23 – Disclosure of Rules, Key Procedures and Market Data

				Require	eme	ent	
23.1	Average daily volumes and notional values of new trades cleared, by instrument/asset class, by currency, and split by OTC or exchange-traded						
	[F	Refer to the explanatory note at t	he end of t	this document for add	ditio	nal details]	
				Disclo	osur	e	
		he metrics below for Exchange Tr ased on the novated settlement i		s with a settlement d		due in the reporting quarte	
		Exchange Traded Instrument		Volume (k)		Value (m)	
		Equities		890.66	;	3,578.88	
		Structured Products		0.60)	7.53	
		Interest Rate Hybrid		0.06	;	1.06	
		Exchange Traded Funds		5.72		91.02	
		Australian Government Bonds		0.02		0.95	
		Company Options		0.40)	1.19	
		Exchange Traded Options		245.88	;	56.00	
		Non - Exchange Traded Instrum	ent	Volume		Value (m)	
		Equity OTC		0.0)	0.0	
		Update Frequency:	C	Quarterly		Last Updated	l: 30 September 2020

Requirement

23.2 Gross notional outstanding/total settlement value of novated but not-yet settled securities transactions per instrument/asset class and currency and split by OTC or exchange-traded

[Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details]

Disclosure

The metrics below are the novated transactions with a settlement date after quarter-end (in line with normal settlement timings).

Equities	11,352.78	
Structured Products	16.17	
Interest Rate Hybrid	2.26	
Exchange Traded Funds	319.82	
Australian Government Bonds	0.70	
Company Options	3.91	

3	Average daily volumes and notional contract values submitted by each execution facility or matching/confirmation venue						
	[Refer to the explanatory note at the end of this document for additional details]						
	Disclosure						
	For Exchange Traded Options the metrics are based on number of trades. Execution Facility Cash Market Cash Market Exchange Traded Options Exchange Traded Options Execution Facility Augreese Daily (olume (ii)) Augreese Daily (olume (iii)) Augreese Daily (olume (iii))						
	Execution Facility						
	Execution Facility ASX Trade	Cash Market Average Daily Volume (k) 890.66	Cash Market Average Daily Value (m) 3,578.88	Exchange Traded Options Average Daily Volume (k) 245.88	Exchange Traded Options Average Daily Value (m) 56.00		

Principle by Principle Notes

Below are the principle by principle notes provided as part of the Public Quantitative Disclosure Standards for Central Counterparties

Principle 4: Credit risk

Item 4.1: This item seeks disclosure of default resources that are available to cover a member default should the margin or equivalent (for example sums paid in by participants to cover their options liabilities) paid by participants to cover their own liabilities to the CCP prove insufficient.

4.1(a)(i) should be identical to DFCCP as defined in BCBS 282.4 Where the CCP's own capital forms part of the default waterfall and potentially covers multiple clearing services with separate segregated default funds, the CCP will have to allocate its capital contribution to each of the segregated funds in proportion to the respective product-specific exposure at default in line with BCBS 282.

4.1(a)(ii) should be identical to DFCM as defined in BCBS 282.

Where commitments in section 4.1(b) are unlimited, state that these are unlimited. Commitments that are reserved to replenish the CCP's own capital or equity should not be included here, i.e. 4.1(b)(ii) and 4.1(b)(iii) seek disclosure of commitments to replenish the CCP's default fund, not the CCP's own capital or equity. Rules-based agreements to accept variation margin or other gains-based haircuts should not be disclosed as commitments, but CCPs should disclose details of such arrangements in line with the guidance on recovery planning (see CPMI-IOSCO *Recovery of financial market infrastructures*, October 2014).

Item 4.2: For a definition of KCCP, see BCBS 282. KCCP may be reported more frequently than quarterly if a CCP is required, under relevant law, to report it to supervisors of clearing members more frequently than quarterly.

Item 4.3: Disclosures should be based on the form in which default resources are held, not the form in which they were paid to the CCP. This item requests disclosures 'as at quarter end'. If a CCP does not consider the composition of collateral at quarter end to be representative, it is encouraged to provide explanatory notes outlining why this is the case, and to provide additional metrics such as quarterly averages, or maximums, minimums, and interquartile ranges. CCPs are also encouraged to disclose any limits on the amount of collateral of a particular type that the CCP will accept if this will assist in enabling a clear understanding of risks. For CCPs which do not specifically record whether asset holdings correspond to default fund contributions (whether provide dby CCP participants or from the CCP's own funds) or to margin provided by participants, the CCP should provide an explanatory note to this effect, and explain its methodology for describing the form in which default fund contributions are held (for example by assuming the proportion of each asset accounted for by default fund is pro-rata to the proportion of total funding that comes from default fund contributions.

Item 4.4: This item is where the results of a CCP's stress-testing of its financial resources are expected to be disclosed. CCPs should specify in their supporting comments to the matrix whether they are subject to a "Cover 1" or "Cover 2" requirement in relation to their total pre-funded default resources, but should report both results so that both Cover 1 and Cover 2 metrics can be compared with actual default resources. These disclosures create no new regulatory obligation for CCPs subject to a Cover 1 requirement to also satisfy a Cover 2 requirement. The disclosures instead aim to support transparency between the CCP and its participants on how safety and efficiency considerations have been balanced in response to different stress scenarios and the decisions that have been made with regard to default fund coverage. Where a CCP is only required to meet a Cover 1 standard, providing disclosure also on its estimated cover 2 requirement may facilitate additional comparisons across CCPs. Nevertheless, because of certain factors, including the size of the market the CCP serves, the CCP's share of that market, and whether a small number of participants account for a disproportionate amount of the CCP's clearing activity, comparison between cover 1 and cover 2 metrics alone

will still give an incomplete comparison of relative default fund coverage. Accordingly, CCPs should provide a comparison with default resources – as in item 4.3, market share data – in accordance with part 23 of the matrix, and other clarifying remarks, as appropriate, alongside their disclosure related to Cover 1 and Cover 2 metrics to further help the reader understand the default fund coverage.

In order to aid clearing members' modelling of their exposures to the CCP, the CCP should consider disclosing further information on its default fund stress-testing methodology (e.g. underlying model parameters and assumptions) insofar as the CCP, in discussion with its participants and regulators, agrees is appropriate without providing confidential information about individual participant positions.

Principle 5: Collateral

Item 5.1: CCPs are encouraged to explain where concentration limits or charges are also applied in addition to normal haircuts. Recognising that the CCP is requested to disclose changes to haircut values as they are applied, where CCPs already publish information on haircuts elsewhere on their public website, a link to the relevant pages will satisfy the disclosure expectation.

Item 5.3: CCPs should consider adding explanatory notes if this would help to understand reasons why the fall in value of assets exceeded haircuts.

Principle 6: Margin

Separate disclosures should be made for each clearing service in respect of items 6.1, 6.2, and 6.5, and each margin model used in that clearing service in respect of 6.3 and 6.4. Disclosures should be on the basis of the form in which the margin is held by the CCP rather than the form in which it was provided by the participants (if different).

Item 6.1: In this item, CCPs should report initial margin *required* – at least at the level of each clearing service. CPMI and IOSCO acknowledge that practices for calculating initial margin requirements vary across CCPs, and propose that CCPs include all types of margin including 'base-line' initial margin; 'add-ons'; and 'retained MTM/VM' (where relevant). Items included under 'add-ons' should reflect any additions to margin required from base-line initial margin and routine scheduled collections – e.g. margin requested to cover specific risks (including, but not limited to liquidity risk, concentration risk, correlation risk, wrong-way risk) where these risks are not covered in the base-line calculation or margin requested on a 'non-routine' basis (e.g. ad-hoc intraday calls). Where add-ons to baseline initial margin are significant and variable, CCPs are encouraged to provide an explanatory note to this effect. CCPs are also encouraged to provide an explanatory note on the expiration period of products they clear where this would help to facilitate interpretation of the margin data, e.g. because margin is returned on or following particular contract expiration dates.

Item 6.2: Disclosures under this item should reflect the total value of initial margin actually *posted* by direct and indirect members and held by the CCP (as opposed to item 6.1, which asks for the total value of initial margin *required*). This should include initial margin provided through a security interest as well as through title transfer. For CCPs which do not specifically record whether asset holdings correspond to margin or default fund contributions fund (whether provided by CCP participants or from the CCP's own funds), the CCP should provide an explanatory note to this effect, and explain its methodology for describing the form in which margin is held (for example by assuming the proportion of each asset accounted for by margin is pro-rata to the proportion of total funding from margin contributions).

Items 6.1 and 6.2: If a CCP does not consider disclosures at quarter end to be representative, it is encouraged to provide explanatory notes outlining why this is the case, and to provide additional metrics such as quarterly averages, or maximums, minimums, and interquartile ranges.

Items 6.3 and 6.4: CPMI and IOSCO recognise that models and approaches to margining may vary across CCPs. In order to help participants understand how they might be affected by margin calls, and/or where the items listed are not specifically relevant for a CCP, other key assumptions and parameters should be disclosed and the items listed should be used as a guide to the types of disclosures and level of details that is expected regarding initial margin assumptions and parameters.

Item 6.5: At a minimum, CCPs are expected to disclose the achieved margin coverage ratio for each clearing service and margin model and the value of any uncovered exposures.

Item 6.6: This disclosure is seeking information on the potential liquidity impact of changes in marked to- market values. It is not seeking to provide information on changes in the level of initial margin that may be related to changes in the volatility of prices. CCPs are expected to disclose the total of variation margin called from participants each day (including for options CCPs, where variation margin is called but not paid out).

Principle 7: Liquidity Risk

'Relevant currencies' refers to currencies in which the CCP is obliged to make pay-outs. If the CCP considers disclosures for 7.1 and 7.2 "as at quarter end" to be unrepresentative, it is encouraged to provide explanatory notes outlining why this is the case, and to provide additional metrics such as quarterly averages, or maximums, minimums, and interquartile ranges.

Items 7.1 and 7.2: CCPs should refer to paragraphs 3.7.10 and 3.7.11 of the PFMI for a definition of 'qualifying liquid resources' and 'supplementary liquidity risk resources'. CCPs are not asked to disclose the names of providers of liquidity resources or investment counterparties. CCPs should not double count assets: for example, assets should not be listed as qualifying under 7.1(e) to the extent that they are required to offer to liquidity providers under 7.1(c). CCPs should add explanatory notes to describe how the CCP decides which payment obligations to prioritize if a schedule does not exist or if otherwise this would help to understand the CCP's procedures.

Item 7.3: This item requests high-level disclosure of the results of a CCP's stress-testing of its liquid resources, both in aggregate and by currency.

Principle 12: Exchange-of-value settlement systems

Items 12.1 and 12.2: The requested percentages refer only to exchange-of-value settlements to which the CCP is a counterparty, and not, for example, to settlement of variation margin payment obligations, or collection and return of initial margin. Gross and net settlement models may qualify as DvP, PvP or DvD, providing that the final settlement of one leg of the exchange occurs if and only if the final settlement of the other leg also occurs.

Principle 13: Default rules and procedures

Item 13.1: CCPs should disclose quantitative information related to defaults as soon as is practicable, subject to constraints on disclosure such as ongoing legal cases.

Principle 14: Segregation and portability

Item 14.1: Disclosures under item 14.1 give quantitative data on the degree of segregation of client assets. Although some CCPs may be unable to disclose particular items (e.g. CCPs may not know the number of clients covered by omnibus accounts), CCPs should complete this item with as much information as is available. For clearing services where fewer than five clients have individually segregated accounts, the CCP should not disclose information on individually segregated accounts.

Principle 15: General business risk

A CCP that discloses these items in a publicly available annual report would meet this standard, but should also include the data in the quantitative disclosure report so that it is readily available in a single place. This information may be disclosed at the level of the legal entity for which published accounts are prepared, even if clearing services are only one part of the entity's activities. The CCP should note the legal entity or activity to which the disclosure relates. The disclosure may be made at the same time as the annual accounts are released.

Item 15.1: The PFMI states that a CCP should hold liquid net assets funded by equity (such as common stock, disclosed reserves, or retained earnings) so that it can continue operations and services as a going concern if it incurs general business losses. Under this item a CCP should disclose the amount of liquid net assets funded by equity which can absorb general business losses. This should, at a minimum, equal at least six months of current operating expenses in accordance with Principle 15. The CCP should not include in its disclosure for 15.1(a) such amount of its own capital as must be allocated or held for other purposes, such as "skin in the game" in the default waterfall, and is not therefore available to cover business risks.

Principle 16: Custody and investment risks

Items 16.1 to 16.3: These items request disclosures 'as at quarter end'. If a CCP does not consider the composition of its investment portfolio at quarter end to be representative, it is encouraged to provide explanatory notes outlining why this is the case, and to provide additional metrics such as quarterly averages, or maximums, minimums, and interquartile ranges. This disclosure looks at the reinvestment of cash received from participants, and not at how the CCP's own funds are held. If, however, participant cash is co-mingled with the CCP's own funds in the investment portfolio, the CCP should clarify how this is reflected in the data published to satisfy this disclosure, for example by specifying the proportion of the investment portfolio that is funded from the CCP's own funds.

Principle 17: Operational risk

Items 17.1, 17.2, 17.3 and 17.4: Core systems used in clearing are those that enable the acceptance and novation of trades, and enable the calculation of margin and settlement obligations. An incident that results in an interruption to the CCP's ability to perform its own functions in relation to trade acceptance and novation, or calculation of margin and settlement obligations is considered a loss of availability. An incident that compromises the CCP's ability to correctly perform the aforementioned functions is also considered a loss of availability, even if there is no actual outage. Successful failover to a back-up site without interruption to services would not count as a loss of availability. CCPs should make clear to which system or systems performance targets apply.

Principle 18: Access and participation

Item 18.1: It is assumed for the purposes of this disclosure that participants would be the legal entities with which the CCP has a counterparty relationship as a clearing member – CCPs should specify if they are using some other basis to define number of participants. Disclosures in this section would not therefore extend to clients. CCPs should report 'category of membership' as relevant to their business. Where relevant, CCPs should differentiate between clearing members that clear their own trades through a CCP and also offer access to the CCP to their clients (often referred to as 'general clearing members') and clearing members that only clear their own trades (often referred to as 'direct clearing members').

Item 18.2: Percentage of net open positions should be the percentage of gross notional for derivatives or the total cleared value for securities transactions or similar.

Items 18.2 to 18.4: For clearing services with fewer than ten members, this report does not make a disclosure recommendation.

Principle 19: Tiered participation arrangements

Item 19.1: For clearing services with fewer than ten members, this report does not make a disclosure recommendation.

Principle 20: FMI links

Items 20.1 to 20.5: These disclosures refer to arrangements in which trades clear over an interoperable link between CCPs, because clearing members are from different CCPs. CCPs should identify each link and cross-margining arrangement in their supporting comments so that quantitative disclosures can be tied to a specific link.

Items 20.2, 20.3, 20.5, 20.6 and 20.7(b): These items request disclosures 'as at quarter end'. If a CCP does not consider disclosures at quarter end to be representative, it is encouraged to provide explanatory notes outlining why this is the case, and to provide additional metrics such as quarterly averages, or maximums, minimums, and interquartile ranges.

Principle 23: Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data

Item 23.1 and 23.2: This item is intended to capture the daily *flow* of clearing activity, while item 23.2 is intended to capture the stock of novated trades that have not yet been settled.

Item 23.3: This information is to be disclosed to facilitate an understanding of which markets might be affected by a CCP being unable to clear. This information should only be provided where the relevant execution facility is content for the CCP to disclose.

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